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health of the .community.20 Under this power, the control over children
for the protection of their health by the state seems almost limitless.21 In
fact the police power of the state has been extended to cover a case in-
volving an unborn child. In Hoener v. Bertinato,'22 parents of an unborn
child refused to consent to a blood transfusion for the child to be given
immediately after birth. Medical opinion and history of past pregnancies
of the mother indicated that the transfusion would be essential to save the
infant's life. The court held that the parents were neglecting to provide
the child with proper protection, and ordered that the blood transfusions
be administered. This unborn child's right to life and health entitled it to
legal protection.
The purpose of the law allowing a state to take custody of a child,
where the child is in need of medical cafe and its parents refuse to permit
such care to be given, is to insure the health, welfare and well being of the
child. Any parental action which would jeopardize this objective con-
stitutes such a violation of duty as to forfeit the right of custody.
20 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Klein v. Klein, 8 App. Div. 2d 844, 190
N.Y.S. 2d 402 (1959).
21 Limitations have been set down in these cases relying on the Washington Supreme
Court Decisions in In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P. 2d 765 (1942). The court
held that it does not have authority to take custody and subject a minor child to surgical
operation over the objection of its parents. The mere fact that a court is convinced of
the necessity of subjecting a minor child to a surgical operation will not sustain a court
order which deprives the parent of the responsibility and the right to decide the ulti-
mate welfare of the child. These limitations, however, have been confined to instances
arising within the State of Washington. In re Frank, 41 Wash. 2d 294, 248 P.2d 553
(1952); In re Petrie, 40 Wash. 2d 809, 246 P. 2d 465 (1952); Wade v. State, 39 Wash.
2d 744, 238 P. 2d 914 (1951).
22 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961).
PATENT LAW-FUNCTION OF THE APPARATUS
REJECTION-INCONSISTENT WITH THE
PATENT ACT OF 1952
Appellant, Loren G. Symons, filed a patent application' claiming as his
invention both a method of and apparatus for grinding2 in a Rotating
and Gyrating Ball Mill. The method sought to be patented comprised
the operative steps performed by the apparatus in effecting the grinding
operation. The Patent Office Examiner reviewing the application, made a
I Serial No. 511,655 filed May 27, 1955, issued as Patent No. 3,042,322 on July 3, 1962.
2 Method or process, and apparatus, are separate classes of subject matter recognized
by statute as patentable. 35 U.S.C.A. S 101 (1953).
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final decision that such a method amounted to no more than the mere
"function of the apparatus" and therefore was unpatentable, citing as
his authority the case of In re Anthony G. Horvath.4 The applicant ap-
pealed from such final rejection to the Patent Office Board of Appeals,
particularly challenging the consistency of the "function of the appa-
ratus" rejection of method claims, with the 1952 Patent Act.5 As to this
issue, the Board of Appeals reversed the examiner's rejection and held
that the rejection of method claims as the "function of the apparatus"
was inconsistent with the 1952 Patent Act. Ex parte Symons, 134 U.S.P.Q.
74 (Pat. Off. Bd. of App., 1962).
The concept that the "function of an apparatus" is unpatentable, had
its origin in an 1853 Supreme Court decision in the case of O'Reilly v.
-Morse.6 That case involved the validity of a reissue claim directed to the
use of the motive power of electro-magnetism for printing intelligible
characters at distances. The court, in holding such claim invalid, con-
cluded that a method claim directed solely to the result accomplished by
the use of a motive power, without reciting the intermediate steps of how
such result is effected, is not a patentable process. The court reasoned that
the result or function of an apparatus is just too broad to be a patentable
process. The same court in Corning v. Burden held later that year, "[such]
method represents the function of the apparatus, or effect produced by
the machine .. [and] it is well settled that a man cannot have a patent on
the abstract effect of a machine, but only for the machine itself."7
This original concept, however, was perverted in a 1901 decision of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in In re Weston." That
court, in an effort to resolve the prevalent confusion over the doctrine,9
compiled prior constructions thereof and concluded that all processes,
mechanical in nature, are unpatentable as the "function of the disclosed
apparatus" unless they can be performed "by another and different ap-
paratus" or "by hand." But this decision requires that an applicant, in
3 This is a case law rejection applied to applications containing both process and
apparatus claims where the process allegedly cannot be performed without the ap-
paratus, the reasoning being that the invention lies only in the claimed apparatus. In re
Ernst et al, 21 C.C.P.A. 1235,71 F.2d 169 (1934).
4 41 C.C.P.A. 844, 211 F.2d 604 (1954).
5 Title 35, U.S.C.A. (1953).
0 15 How. 61 (U.S., 1853).
7 15 How. 252, 268 (U.S., 1853) (emphasis added).
8 17 D.C. App. 431 (1901).
9 In Risdon Iron and Locomotive Works v. Medart, the Supreme Court indicated
that only processes which involved chemical or other elemental action were patentable.
158 U.S. 68 (1895).
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addition to his original machine, either show an old apparatus employing
his method, or invent a new one; and if he does the former, the method
will undoubtedly be rendered unpatentable as being anticipated in the
prior art. Further, this decision equates "function of the apparatus" with
the method performed by the apparatus, rather than the "result or effect
of the apparatus" established in the Morse and Corning Cases.
Despite the obvious inconsistency of the Weston Case with the doc-
trine laid down in the Morse and Corning Cases, the decision in the
Weston Case still stands as law, only the exceptions being modified. The
criterion of "other apparatus" was gradually narrowed by the courts to
"apparatus having nonequivalent elements,"'1 then "apparatus differing
substantially,"" next "apparatus differing in its essential character"'12 and
finally "apparatus differing substantially in its essential character."'3 The
"by hand" exception was expanded to include hand operation with
"prior art apparatus"'14 or "ordinary tools of common usage."'15 In addi-
tion, two other exceptions were recognized: the first arose in cases where
the apparatus is capable of performing other and different methods;',
and the second, where there are no allowable or allowed apparatus
claims. 17 Thus evolved the doctrine as it is known today.
In holding this doctrine to be inconsistent with the 1952 Patent Act in
the Symons Case,"" the Board of Appeals premised their decision upon the
congressional intent underlying the statute.19 The substitution of "proc-
ess" for "art" in section 10120 and the definition thereof in section 100(b)
as including "a new use of a known ... machine"21 were cited to show
congressional intent to grant patents on both apparatus and processes of
machines. The board then, however, equated "known" in section 100(b)
10 In re Ernst, 21 C.C.P.A. 1235, 71 F. 2d 169 (1934).
11 In re Middleton, 35 C.C.P.A. 1166, 167 F. 2d 1012 (1948).
12 In re Nichols, 36 C.C.P.A. 759, 171 F. 2d 300 (1948).
Is In re Ashbaugh, 36 C.C.P.A. 902, 173 F. 2d 273 (1949).
14 In re McKee, 23 C.C.P.A. 717, 79 F. 2d 905 (1935).
15 In re Parker, 23 C.C.P.A. 721, 79 F. 2d 908 (1935).
16 In re Middleton, 35 C.C.P.A. 1166, 167 F. 2d 1012 (1948); Ex parte Scherer, 103
U.S.P.Q. 107 (Pat. Off. Bd. of App., 1954).
17 In re Horvath, 41 C.C.P.A. 844, 211 F. 2d 604 (1954).
18 134 U.S.P.Q. 74, 80 (1962).
19 Tit. 35, U.S.C.A. (1953).
20 "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, ... may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C.A.
§ 101 (1953).
21 "The term 'process' means process, art or method, and includes a new use for a
known .... machine ..... 35 U.S.C.A. § 100(b) (1953).
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with "new" and pointed out that "[c]learly, the same is true if the process
is a new use of a new aPparatus."22
Supplementing that argument, the board cited the new provision in
section 121, which states that where two independent inventions arc
sought to be patented in a single application, neither shall operate as a ref-
erence against the other, either as an application or a patent.23 The board
then added, "the inference is clear that it is contrary to congressional in-
tent to reject either one [process or apparatus] on the basis of, or because
of the existence of, the other in the same case."
'24
The board further propounded as its strongest argument, that the change
from the permissive "may" to the mandatory "shall" in section 102 so
that it now reads "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . "1
coupled with the addition of section 101 of the phrase "subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title," 26 expressly forbid the use of
nonstatutory provisions to deny patentability. The board could find no
statutory support for the rejection and concluded that a method satisfy-
ing all statutory requirements for patentability, could not be so rejected;
holding, "There being no statutory basis for the rejection, it should, in
our opinion, be reversed. '27
Chief Examiner McCann dissented to Chief Examiner Bailey's majority
opinion, but did not attack it on its merits. Instead, he but states his af-
firmance of the examiner's proposition that the U.S. Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals had sustained such rejection after the enactment of
the statute.28
Prior to the holding in the Symons Case, substantially the same con-
clusion was reached by the District Court for the District of Columbia in
Societi Anonyme v. Marzall.29 In addition, Bailey has expressed the same
or similar arguments in several earlier cases in concurring or dissenting
opinions. In Ex parte Goldsmith3° he analyzed the Supreme Court cases
bearing on the issue and reached a conclusion identical to the proposition
22 134 U.S.P.Q. 74, 81 (1962).
2335 U.S.C.A. § 121 (1953).
24 134 U.S.P.Q. 74, 82 (1962).
25 The phrase, "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless. (emphasis added) is
followed by exceptions (a) through (g) which prohibit issuance of a patent in certain
instances. 35 U.S.C.A. § 102 (1953).
26 See note 20. 27 134 U.S.P.Q. 74, 83 (1962).
28 134 U.S.P.Q. 74, 84 (1962).
29 108 F. Supp. 310 (D.D.C., 1952). This case was ignored by the same court in a later
case which held contra thereto. Ferro Engineering Co. v. Watson, 151 F. Supp. 167
(D.D.C., 1957).
3) U.S.P.Q. 403 (Pat. Off. Bd. App., 1952).
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set forth in O'Reilly v. Morse."' In Ex parte Kennedy,32 Ex parte Hart,.3
and Ex parte Roth and Rich,3 4 he set forth the same arguments presented
in the Symons Case.
Of the three arguments set forth by Bailey in the Symons Case, the
proposition that Congress intended the term "known" in section 100(b)
of the 1952 Patent Act35 to include a "new apparatus" is supported nei-
ther by the revisions noted for that section, 6 nor by case law.3 7 Further,
the applicability of section 12138 is somewhat doubtful since the instant
rejection is not concerned with the disclosed apparatus as a "reference"
against the method of claims, but rather as an aid in determining whether
the method is a "statutory process. ' 39
The third argument propounded by Bailey, however, is tenable and
finds support in two recent cases. In In re Guido H. Stempel, Jr.,40 the
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that "under 35
USC 102, an applicant is entitled to a patent unless it is shown that one
or another of the prohibitory provisions therein or elsewhere in the stat-
ute applies." Also, the District Court for the District of Columbia held in
Monaco v. Hoffman,41 "The patent law is, however, entirely statutory
and, unlike the common law, may not be molded and adjusted by judicial
decisions to meet shifting needs and changing conditions. The Congress
alone may afford a remedy, if one is needed."
In addition to supporting that argument, those two cases, and the Sy-
mons Case, represent the most recent decisions on that issue, and the
three decisions further represent three of the most respected tribunals in
patent law. Thus, this could be the beginning of a trend to abolish all case
law tests for patentability not grounded in the 1952 Patent Act. Whether
or not this trend materializes with respect to all such tests remains to be
seen, but with respect to the instant "function of the apparatus" rejection,
the trend has materialized, and it is anticipated that it will be followed.
31 15 How. 61 (U.S., 1853).
32 105 U.S.P.Q. 338 (Pat. Off. Bd. App., 1955).
33 117 U.S.P.Q. 193 (Pat. Off. Bd. App., 1957).
34 118 U.S.P.Q. 112 (Pat. Off. Bd. App., 1958).
35 Tit. 35 U.S.C.A. (1953).
36 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y., No. 8, page 584 (1952).
37 Though this same argument was expressed in the majority opinion in Ex parte
Kansas, the court s conclusion was that structural limitations in a process claim, other-
wise not affecting patentability, shall not affect it merely because they represent a new
structure. 125 u.sP.Q. 419, (Pat. Off. Bd. App., 1960).
38 35 U.S.C.A. S 121 (1953).
39 Ex parte Gutterman, 104 U.S.P.Q. 89 (Pat. Off. Bd. App., 1954).
40 44 C.C.P.A. 820, 241 F. 2d 755 (1957).
41 189 F. Supp. 474 (D.D.C., 1960).
